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Introduction
In 1996, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act,1 or “PRWORA,” more commonly known as federal “welfare reform.”
Congress designed the Act to address what it identified as several intractable problems in the
welfare system: long-term dependency (and inter-generational dependency) on welfare benefits;
out-of-wedlock pregnancies in the welfare population; and the lack of two-parent families.2 In
order to address these issues, the Act included provisions to require recipients to participate in
work activities as a condition of receipt of benefits,3 to limit the length of time that recipients
may receive benefits,4 and to promote marriage.5
Although these provisions represented important and fundamental changes in the federal
approach to welfare, there were even more dramatic changes in PRWORA: the Act eliminated
the federal welfare entitlement for recipients,6 and devolved primary responsibility for welfare
from the federal government to the states.7 The Act effected this devolution through the
formation of a federal block-grant to the states,8 replacing the previous federal-state
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administrative and financing arrangement known as “cooperative federalism.”9 The elimination
of the federal entitlement in combination with devolution gave the states far greater latitude in
designing, administering, and implementing their welfare programs.10
This devolution approach to welfare—a hallmark of what many call the “New
Federalism”—was driven largely by proponents’ desire to increase state flexibility and
experimentation in the welfare arena, allowing each state to tailor its program more precisely to
local social, political, and economic conditions within that state. Opponents of devolution
responded that devolution and the lack of federal standards, including the federal entitlement to
benefits, would cause states to engage in a “race-to-the-bottom” as they design welfare programs
to repel poor citizens (and thus avoid becoming “welfare magnets”) and to attract and retain nonpoor (taxpaying) citizens. A debate about devolution in the welfare arena was thus framed
around issues of state flexibility, experimentation, and jurisdictional competition. This debate
raged in the legal literature, in the social science literature, in Congress and the states, and even
in the courts (although, as described below, the Supreme Court in Saenz v. Roe11 effectively put
an end to these debates in the courts). The welfare devolution debate continues to occupy space
in the public discourse about welfare reform: it remains a prominent part of academic and policy
evaluations of the original PRWORA and is reemerging in Congress as it considers variations of
welfare devolution through reauthorization of PRWORA and as it debates devolution proposals
for Food Stamps and Medicaid. The broader welfare devolution debate considered in this article
cuts across welfare programs and expands from the original policy debates over the devolution in
PRWORA to the current devolution debates in the context of reauthorization of PRWORA and
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in the context of other current welfare reform proposals. This article considers all of these
debates together—as the “welfare devolution debate”—and distinguishes between devolution
debates on particular welfare programs only where such distinction is helpful to elucidate a
rhetorical point in the debate.
The predominant rhetoric12 in the welfare devolution debate—experimentation and
flexibility, state responsiveness to local needs, and “race-to-the-bottom” versus “race-to-thetop”—has an intuitive appeal. After all, we can easily imagine two hypothetical and contiguous
states availing themselves of newfound flexibility and designing welfare programs to better meet
the unique demands of their individual situations. And we can imagine that a policy that
unleashes two programs (one for each state)—as opposed to a policy that protects a monopolistic
single program (for the federation of the two states)—would seem to allow greater
experimentation in the design of programs. We can imagine that these experiments, through
trial-and-error and information sharing, should eventually result in better overall policy. We
might also reasonably intuit that our two states, being closer to their citizens than the federation
government, would be in a better situation to tailor individualized programs for their poor and to
respond to the needs of all their citizens. Thus, pro-devolution arguments have some intuitive
appeal on the basis of state flexibility and responsiveness to local needs.
But we can also easily imagine that these two hypothetical states would observe each
other closely in designing their programs, because the states will reasonably anticipate that
relatively generous programs will attract migrating poor from the other state, while relatively
12
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stingy programs will repel them. The more generous state may therefore reasonably expect an
influx of poor from its neighbor. We may reasonably intuit that each state will attempt to avoid
attracting the poor (because they are perceived to be expensive, unappealing citizens) and that
each state will therefore seek to provide benefits that are not relatively generous. Because the
states observe each other in designing their programs, a competition will ensue, in which each
states’ welfare program exerts downward pressure on the welfare program of the other state until
both states reach an equilibrium bottom—which is severely detrimental to the poor in both states.
Thus, anti-devolution arguments have some intuitive appeal based on the notion that states will
want to avoid becoming “welfare magnets” and therefore will engage in a “race-to-the-bottom.”
The attractiveness and ubiquity of these intuitive arguments can be illustrated by the
observation that they have essentially comprised the entire lexicon in the welfare devolution
debate. These same arguments—or thinly veiled facsimiles—appear throughout the public
discourse in academia, the popular press, policy institutions, and even the courts. Indeed, as
described more fully below,13 it is difficult to find a public statement in the welfare devolution
debate that does not somehow conform to the essential language and ideas of these arguments.
This is problematic, because while the arguments appear to represent polar positions on a
uni-dimensional devolution spectrum, in fact these arguments represent variant positions in only
a single dimension of a much more complicated, multi-dimensional spectrum. In other words,
the lexicon of the devolution debate fails to account for other relevant principles in considering
how to sort out federal-state relations in the design and delivery of welfare programs.
We can gain a window into the myopia of the debate by tracing these arguments to a
common intellectual root, Charles Tiebout’s famous 1956 article, A Pure Theory of Local
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Expenditures.14 Tiebout’s singular contribution was to establish a market paradigm in the
allocation of public goods, thus showing that public goods could be allocated in an economically
optimal way, given certain rigid assumptions.15 Tiebout’s market is comprised of local
governments, each offering a unique tax-benefit package, coupled with full citizen mobility and
knowledge, such that citizens “vote with their feet” and migrate to the jurisdiction that best
satisfies their tax-benefit preferences.16 The model’s central assumptions of local responsiveness
and citizen mobility thus combine to achieve a market-like equilibrium in the provision of local
public goods.17
Tiebout’s original economic model evolved through subsequent scholars, social
scientists, and policymakers into a model of “jurisdictional competition,” in which local
jurisdictions actively compete to attract certain citizens (and repel others) by adopting appealing
(or distasteful) tax-benefit packages. Thus, jurisdictions use their flexibility to experiment with
different policies in an attempt to satisfy citizen preferences, i.e., they “race to the top” by
providing optimal tax-benefit packages for their citizens. But for some policies—those that
benefit groups that the majority perceives to be a drag on state resources—jurisdictional
competition theory predicts that states satisfy majority citizen preferences by repelling these
presumably undesirable citizens by diminishing programs that benefit them. States thus act to
avoid becoming “magnets” for these citizens by engaging in a “race-to-the-bottom” in policies
that benefit them. The lexicon and ideas of the neo-Tieboutian jurisdictional competition
model—and, even more narrowly, the specific assumption of full citizen mobility within that
model—then, exactly match the lexicon and ideas of the devolution debate.
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Grounding the devolution debate exclusively in this neo-Tieboutian rhetoric results in an
incomplete array of possibilities for federal-state relationships in providing welfare services.
There are several endogenous reasons for this—reasons that grow out of flaws in the
jurisdictional competition model itself, as it is applied to redistributional programs.18 First,
welfare recipients occupy a unique place within a jurisdictional competition model: they are at
the same time citizen-voters (with or without political power), direct recipients of (politically
unpopular) government largesse, and mobile externalities of an economy or social system.
Tiebout’s model and its jurisdictional competition progeny do not fully account for these
complex relationships between welfare recipients and the state. Second, jurisdictional
competition does not account for varying bureaucratic competencies among governments and
informational economies of scale within governments. For example, the model fails to properly
account for the unique expertise of the federal government based upon its experiences with more
than 50 state bureaucracies and welfare programs. Third, according to the vast (and increasing)
social science literature, the most we can say about the rigid Tiebout assumptions is that we do
not know if they are satisfied in the second-best real world. For example, the vast and increasing
research on Tiebout’s central assumption of citizen mobility has produced little conclusive
evidence (either way) on whether welfare recipients actually migrate based on state welfare
benefit levels, or, put another way, whether we actually observe the “opportunistic welfare
migration” that we would expect in a first-best jurisdictional competition world.
It is not my primary intent here, however, to weigh-in in any serious way in the debate on
the accuracy or usefulness of the jurisdictional competition model. Instead, I intend to comment
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on the nature of the debate itself. I argue that we ought to expand the very parameters of the
devolution debate to include other factors, some endogenous and some exogenous to the
jurisdictional competition model but nevertheless relevant to federal-state relationships in
welfare programs.19 Considerations of citizen knowledge and externalities are two principles
endogenous to the model that may help us sort out appropriate governmental roles. Political
participation, community values, and considerations of equality and justice are three principles
exogenous to the model that may serve a sorting function.20 Looking beyond the limited spaces
of economics, and considering citizens outside of their economic selves, we may discover new
ideas for welfare federalism.
This paper first closely examines Tiebout’s original hypothesis and the neo-Tieboutian
theory of jurisdictional competition. Next, the paper attempts to ground the devolution debate in
academia, the press, policy institutions, and the courts in a neo-Tieboutian framework. It argues
that the devolution debate is rooted in neo-Tieboutian rhetoric.
The article then identifies some additional relevant considerations, or sorting principles,
that have been absent from the debate. These principles help illustrate the myopia of the current
debate and the resultant paucity of welfare federalism possibilities. The article suggests how an
expanded debate, with an expanded array of principles, might result in a richer, more complex,
and certainly different type of federal-state relationship in the design and delivery of welfare
programs.
19
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Part I: Tiebout’s Model and Jurisdictional Competition
Charles Tiebout’s theory of jurisdictional competition provides a model for the way in
which public goods are efficiently produced by various local public entities, or local
governments.21 Tiebout developed this jurisdictional competition model in response to a
problem identified by Paul Samuelson22 and Richard Musgrave, 23 among others, that no market
solution existed to determine an efficient level of expenditures on public goods, when there is
only one supplier of those goods, as in the case of the federal government. In other words,
Samuelson and Musgrave concluded that public goods cannot be allocated with market
efficiency in the absence of competition among multiple suppliers (or multiple public entities).
This inefficiency manifests itself on both the supply side and the demand side. On the supply
side, the lack of market competition results in overstated costs of public goods—the government
pays too much for the services it provides. On the demand side, consumers—citizens—cannot
accurately register their preferences for public goods in terms of the costs of public goods,
because the costs are always overstated. Professors Bratton and McCahery summarize the
Samuelson-Musgrave problem thus:
According to the “Samuelson condition,” public goods are allocated efficiently
when the sum of a citizen’s marginal rate of substitution of income for the good
equals the marginal cost of an additional unit of the good. The Samuelson
condition, however, is not easily met. With private goods, market competition
exerts downward pressure on producers’ marginal costs, and market prices
provide concrete information about consumers’ rates of substitution. With public
goods, in contrast, no obvious market exerts downward pressure on government
producers’ marginal costs. Nor does an obvious mechanism force taxpaying
citizen-consumers truthfully to reveal their rates of substitution.24
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As a result, according to Samuelson and Musgrave, the allocation of public goods is
necessarily inefficient in the absence of market pressures. In the case of the federal government
supplying uniquely federal goods, therefore, those goods cannot be provided with market
efficiency.
Tiebout responded to this conclusion by examining the allocation of public goods on the
local, not federal, level. He created a model in which multiple local governments compete as
suppliers for taxpaying citizens in the market for local public goods. According to this model,
each local government offers a unique tax-benefit package, and citizens “shop” for a jurisdiction
that best matches their tax-benefit preferences. On the supply side, local governments compete
to respond to citizen demand in the marketplace, exerting downward pressure on the marginal
costs of public goods. On the demand side, fully informed and mobile citizens “vote with their
feet”25 and migrate to the jurisdiction that provides their desired public goods at a tax rate equal
to (or less than) their marginal rate of substitution of income for the goods.26 Indeed, according
to Tiebout, “[t]he act of moving or failing to move is crucial. Moving or failing to move replaces
the usual market test of willingness to buy a good and reveals the consumer-voter’s demand for
public goods.”27 According to the model, then, the equilibrium level of taxes and public goods
that results in each jurisdiction will exactly match citizen preferences in each jurisdiction,
achieving a market equilibrium in the provision of local public goods.28
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Tiebout, in perhaps “one of the most-quoted paragraphs from one of the most-cited
articles in urban politics[,]”29 summarized this theory as follows:
The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best
satisfies his preference pattern for public goods. . . . At the central level the
preferences of the consumer-voter are given, and the government tries to adjust to
the pattern of these preferences, whereas at the local level various governments
have their revenue and expenditure patterns more or less set. Given these revenue
and expenditure patterns, the consumer-voter moves to that community whose
local government best satisfies his set of preferences.30
Tiebout’s singular contribution was thus to create this market mechanism for the provision of
local public goods, which ensures efficiency in the market for local public goods and overcomes
the Samuelson-Musgrave problem.31
The model, of course, relies on several key assumptions:
1. Consumer-voters are fully mobile and will move to that community
where their preference patterns, which are set, are best satisfied.
2. Consumer-voters are assumed to have full knowledge of differences
among revenue and expenditure patterns and to react to these differences.
3. There are a large number of communities in which the consumer-voters
may choose to live.
4. Restrictions due to employment opportunities are not considered. It
may be assumed that all persons are living on dividend income.
5. The public services supplied exhibit no external economies or
diseconomies between communities.
...
6. For every pattern of community services . . . there is an optimal
community size.
...
7. . . . [C]ommunities below the optimum size seek to attract new
residents to lower average costs. Those above the optimum size do just the
opposite. Those at an optimum try to keep their populations constant.32
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Three policy implications flow from this model. First, integration across jurisdictions “is
justified [on economic welfare grounds] only if more of any service is forthcoming at the same
total cost and without reduction of any other service.”33 Although Tiebout is not specific about
this, we would expect the reverse to hold, as well—that is, disintegration of services and
devolution to various sub-jurisdictions also is justified on economic welfare grounds only if
services increase or remain constant at the same total cost and without reduction of any other
service. Tiebout offers a helpful example of police services—specifically, municipal versus
local police—but, under the model, this principle applies to any public service.
Second, policies that promote citizen mobility and dissemination of information—i.e.,
policies that advance a community toward the ideal of the mobility assumption and the
knowledge assumption—enhance the economic efficiency in the allocation of public goods.34
Although Tiebout is not specific about this, we would expect, similarly, that policies that
advance communities toward the ideal encompassed in any of the assumptions, ceteris paribus,
would enhance the efficient allocation of public goods.
Finally, larger and dynamic communities may not be able to maintain a fixed revenueexpenditure pattern, as the model contemplates.35 Tiebout poses this issue as a normative one
and fails to provide any extensive thoughts on it, but the implications are important for our
purposes here.
Tiebout recognized some of the potential limitations of this model and qualified it
accordingly. For example, Tiebout recognized that the economies assumption may not always
hold, and that integration across local public entities may enhance the efficient allocation of
public goods where disintegration results in diseconomies of scale (or where integration may
33
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create economies of scale).36 If two communities—especially contiguous communities—can
avoid diseconomies of scale (or can achieve economies of scale) by coordinating their public
services in some way, they ought to do so. Tiebout also recognized that the mobility assumption
and the knowledge assumption may not hold in the real world, and that we do not fully
understand how people make decisions about where to live.37
Tiebout’s economic model helped spawn the development of the neo-Tieboutian theory
of “jurisdictional competition.” The jurisdictional competition theory states that local
jurisdictions—or states, as this theory seems to arise most often in the context of federalism
debates, in which the central issue is state versus federal authority—actively compete with each
other to retain and attract desirable, taxpaying citizens in the market for public goods. For most
public goods, this competition has been described as a “race-to-the-top” among jurisdictions, as
governments offer increasingly appealing packages of taxes and services to attract immigrants
from other jurisdictions and to discourage the emigration of their own citizens. In a federalist
system of government, in order to promote this competition among states and local
jurisdictions—and thus to promote the economic efficiencies and optimal tax and service
packages promised by the Tiebout model—the argument goes, we should devolve programs to
the state and local level, granting these jurisdictions the flexibility and authority to compete,
experiment, and respond to the needs of their citizens.
But for some public goods—most notably environmental regulation and social welfare
programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) and food stamps—the
competition has been described as a “race-to-the-bottom,” in which each jurisdiction competes to
minimize the public good in order to attract certain citizens and repel others. In the much

36
37

Id. at 423.
Id. at 423.

13

discussed case of environmental regulation, the jurisdictional competition theory predicts that
states will compete for desirable businesses at the expense of environmental protection and thus
race to the bottom in the provision of environmental regulation. In the case of social welfare
programs, the theory predicts that states will compete to repel economically, socially, and
politically undesirable poor citizens by cutting relatively generous social welfare programs.
States that provide relatively generous benefits, on the other hand, will encourage opportunistic
welfare migration and become “welfare magnets” for the undesirable poor. The theory predicts
that states will thus race to the bottom in the provision of social welfare benefits and programs,
reducing those programs to a bare minimum or, in the extreme, eliminating them altogether.38
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At the most simple level, consider, for example, two jurisdictions, each with authority to tax and spend, each with
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Alternatively, consider the same two jurisdictions, but assume that jurisdiction A provides recipients with
$100 per month for the first three years and $50 per month for the next two years. Jurisdiction B, in contrast,
provides each recipient with $75 per month for five years. According to the Tiebout hypothesis, we (and
jurisdictions A and B) would expect a rational welfare recipient may choose to reside in jurisdiction A for three
years and then to move to jurisdiction B for two years in order to maximize benefits between the two jurisdictions.
In order to preempt the anticipated migration, jurisdiction B will reduce its benefits during the final two years of
eligibility to $50. In response, jurisdiction A will reduce its own benefits during the first three years to $75 in order
to prevent migration during those years. (The jurisdictions may continue to reduce their welfare benefits in a
competition to encourage the emigration of their own poor citizens.) At the close of this “race-to-the-bottom,” the
resulting equilibrium level of welfare benefits in both jurisdictions will be $75 for the first three years and $50 for
the final three years (or less, if the jurisdictions continue to compete to encourage welfare emigration). Just like the
equilibrium in the first example, the equilibrium in this example is, at most, the lowest level of benefits offered by
each jurisdiction at the beginning of the competition.
We may observe these phenomena outside the arena of cash benefits, as well. For example, we can easily
imagine that states might similarly race to the bottom by implementing more stringent requirements for program
participation—e.g., more stringent work requirements or collateral program requirements—or more challenging
administrative hurdles to gaining or retaining benefits—e.g., application requirements, reporting requirements, etc.
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In contemporary federalism debates, we increasingly hear the rhetoric of the neoTieboutian jurisdictional competition theory to justify or oppose devolution of authority from the
federal government to the states.39 Proponents of devolution thus employ concepts and
arguments related to local flexibility, experimentation, and competition among jurisdictions in
the market for public goods. Market-like efficiency in the provision of public goods, they say,
can only come through local competition, and competition can only be achieved by providing
states increased flexibility and the ability to experiment—i.e., the ability to craft their own
unique tax-benefit packages to retain and attract citizens that are desirable to them. In our
federal system, this means devolution of authority to the states.
Similarly, opponents of devolution use concepts and arguments related to the “race-tothe-bottom” and “welfare magnets,” implying that jurisdictional competition results in an
artificial decrease in certain public goods, as states and local jurisdictions compete to attract
desirable citizens (such as corporations, in the case of environmental regulation goods) and to
repel undesirable others (such as the poor, in the case of social welfare benefits). To opponents,
only integration of goods at the federal level (in the form of federal standards or federal
entitlements, for example) will ensure that states do not reduce certain public goods to an

For a more sophisticated, mathematical model of the race to the bottom, see JAN K. BRUECKNER, WELFARE
REFORM AND INTERSTATE WELFARE COMPETITION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 7-12 (Urban Inst. 1998), available at
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=307786.
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Neo-Tieboutian rhetoric is not limited to the welfare devolution debate. For example, commenting on broader
federalism debates, outside the welfare arena, Professor Pettys wrote the following:
In their quest to comprehend federalism, jurists have devoted considerable attention to
the benefits that may be achieved when state and local governments compete with one another for
a mobile citizenry. Prompted in part by Charles Tiebout’s famous 1956 article, many have
wedded themselves to the view that horizontal competition among states and localities helps to
ensure that citizens will have an array of governmental options from which to choose and that
governments will have a marketlike incentive to satisfy citizens’ demands in increasingly efficient
ways. This argument finds a close cousin in the frequent observation that states and localities
serve as laboratories for testing social and economic programs.
Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329,
331-32 (2003) (citations omitted).
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unsustainably low level as a result of this competition among jurisdictions. In our federal
system, this means the retention of standards and authority at the federal level.
But while these apparently polar positions result in two different conclusions about the
merits of devolution, they derive from the same neo-Tieboutian jurisdictional competition theory
and its assumptions. The next section explores these positions in the context of the federalism
debate over welfare reform.

Part II: Neo-Tieboutian Rhetoric in the Debate on Welfare Reform
For much of the recent history of our social welfare system, federal-state relationships in
the delivery of social welfare programs are best described in terms of some form of cooperative
federalism. For our purposes, there are three hallmarks of this arrangement. First, the federal
government sets certain standards for the states—rules with which states must comply in
providing benefits to families—and entitlements for recipients.40 The focus of the regulations is
on who qualifies for benefits, based largely on income, and the technical parameters within
which states must work to provide those benefits. The regulations act to protect recipients and
ensure their federal entitlement within the state program. Second, funding is based on a shared
formula, in which the level of federal funding is a function of individual state need. The federal
share of the total formula is a multiple of state expenditures, thus providing an incentive for
states to spend more, not less, on their programs. Finally, states have some flexibility to tailor
certain limited elements of their programs, such as individual standards of need for recipients.
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rules”).
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This flexibility derives from the reality that standards of need may vary from location to location,
and that states are in a better position than the federal government to assess needs.
This form of cooperative federalism came to an end—in the Aid to Families of
Dependent Children (“AFDC”) program, at least—in 1996, when Congress enacted the
PRWORA.41 The PRWORA replaced cooperative federalism with devolution, with three
hallmarks that correspond to the hallmarks of cooperative federalism. First, the PRWORA
changed the nature of federal standards from a focus on benefits to a focus on work. The
PRWORA thus regulates the nature of recipients’ work and states’ work participation rates and
eliminates federal protections for the receipt of benefits—including the individual entitlement for
benefits. Second, the PRWORA changed the funding mechanism by replacing the cooperative
funding formula—which encourages states to increase funding—to a fixed block-grant—which
encourages states to decrease funding. Finally, the PRWORA provides states with greater
flexibility to tailor their own individual programs, within the parameters of the very broad goals
of the PRWORA and the more specific federal work participation rates.
The shift from cooperative federalism to devolution in the AFDC and TANF programs—
and in welfare programs more generally, such as Food Stamps and Medicaid—is ensconced in a
public discourse that draws almost exclusively on neo-Tieboutian rhetoric and the language of
interstate jurisdictional competition, particularly as they relate to Tiebout’s mobility assumption.
Indeed, it is difficult to find rhetoric, arguments, or analysis in the public record of the
devolution debate that is rooted in anything but the mobility assumption within the neoTieboutian lexicon. The pro-devolution side of the debate is framed in terms of “flexibility,”
“experimentation,” “responsiveness to local (state) needs,” and “race-to-the-top,” while the antidevolution side of the debate is framed in terms of “welfare magnets,” and “race-to-the-bottom.”
41

Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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This section traces this rhetoric through the welfare devolution debates, discourse, and
analyses in academia, policy institutions, and the press, and the devolution debates in Congress,
the states, and the courts. It is worth reminding the reader that “welfare devolution debates” or
“devolution debates” as used here do not refer exclusively to the devolution debates surrounding
the original PRWORA; rather, I use those terms to include the devolution debates with respect to
AFDC/TANF, Food Stamps, and Medicaid in the original welfare reform bills, with respect to
these programs in the reauthorization legislation, and with respect to welfare programs generally.
An analysis by Professors Buckley and Brinig well represents the rhetoric on the prodevolution side of the debate in academia:
Many of the standard arguments for assigning powers to the state level
apply in the case of welfare responsibilities. Devolution of welfare powers
usefully reduces information costs, promotes experimentation, and permits people
to sort themselves out by policy preferences through migration.
....
Had there been a race to the bottom, states would have reacted to increased
welfare pressure with welfare cuts. We find no evidence that this happened.42
The anti-devolution side of the debate in academia has featured perhaps even stronger
neo-Tieboutian rhetoric and analysis. This side of the debate seems to recognize some of the
benefits of local flexibility in welfare delivery systems, but it is concerned about a race to the
bottom among independently operating states, based on jurisdictional competition assumptions,
most notably the mobility assumption. This side of the debate, therefore, tends to focus on the
phenomenon of opportunistic welfare migration.
Paul Peterson is an eloquent and thoughtful leader on this side of the debate. In The Price
of Federalism, Peterson predicts a race to the bottom43 and welfare magnets44 based on data that

42

F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 142-44
(1997).
43
PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 126 (1995).
44
Id. at 123.
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indicate that after 1969 the poor considered welfare benefits in making residential choices—i.e.,
that opportunistic welfare migration exists—and that states actively and rationally adjust their
welfare programs to avoid an influx of the poor.45 Peterson and Marc C. Rom’s book Welfare
Magnets: A New Case for a National Standard is devoted almost entirely to issues of
opportunistic welfare migration and, as the title suggests, the magnetic effects of state welfare
programs.46
David Ellwood of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
testified before the Senate Finance Committee in 1996 on welfare reform:
I am fearful that the current round of reform proposals are more likely to simply
reduce benefits and cut people off than move people from welfare to work. The
danger of a race to the bottom is very real.
....
Some states may find it much easier to move people from welfare to the state
border than from welfare to work. And so the race to the bottom may begin.47

45

Id. The journal Publius ran an excellent series of articles on welfare devolution in its Summer 1998 edition.
These articles invariably turn to neo-Tieboutian language and analyses in examining issues of welfare devolution.
Richard M. Francis, Predictions, Patterns, and Policymaking: A Regional Study of Devolution, PUBLIUS, Summer
1998, at 143 (examining the response of state officials under welfare devolution, in light of the opposing forecasts of
“race to the bottom” and local support for the poor); Samuel H. Beer, Welfare Reform: Revolution or Retrenchment,
PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at 9, 12 (“If there is a race to the bottom, that surely spells retrenchment. The possibility is
inherent in the United States federal system. Thanks to its dispersion of authority among the states, American
federalism gives rise to that familiar problem of collective action in which competition among separate actors tempts
them individually to do what they otherwise prefer not to do.”); Scott W. Allard, Revisiting Shapiro: Welfare
Magnets and State Residency Requirements in the 1990s, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at 45 (reviewing the evidence on
opportunistic welfare migration in the context of welfare residency requirements); Sanford F. Schram & Joe Soss,
Making Something Out of Nothing: Welfare Reform and a New Race to the Bottom, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at 67
(critically examining the “laboratories of democracy,” “welfare magnet,” and “race to the bottom,” theses); Irene
Lurie, Watching the Race: Where You Sit Affects What You See, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at 89 (questioning the
“race to the bottom” and “welfare magnet” theses); Jocelyn M. Johnston & Kara Lindaman, Implementing Welfare
Reform in Kansas: Moving, but not Racing, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at 123 (examining the “race to the bottom”
theses in the context of Kansas’s welfare program); Mark Carl Rom, Paul E. Peterson, & Kenneth F. Scheve, Jr.,
Interstate Competition and Welfare Policy, PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, at 17 (examining welfare devolution and
interstate competition).
46
PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD (1990). But
see Sanford Schram, et al., Without Cause or Effect: Reconsidering Welfare Migration as a Policy Problem, 42 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 210 (1998).
47
Welfare and Medicaid Reform: Hearing on S. 1795 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 104th Cong. 114-15
(1996) (statement of David T. Ellwood, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University). See also R.
KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 27-28 (2000) (“State discretion in administering the program
may also lead to competition among states to keep benefits low to avoid becoming a ‘welfare magnet,’ attracting
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Other empirical and policy analyses have been less conclusive, but they nevertheless are
couched in neo-Tieboutian terms, examining neo-Tieboutian assumptions.48 A variety of
empirical studies from academics and policy think-tanks have examined interstate jurisdictional
competition in welfare programs49 and, particularly, opportunistic welfare migration.50
In the law and policy literature, commentators have similarly conformed their analyses of
welfare devolution to the neo-Tieboutian lexicon. For example, one commentator concluded
firmly that welfare devolution would result in a race to the bottom.51 Another concluded that
opportunistic welfare migration is more myth than reality, 52 but that states nevertheless react to
changing poverty rates—even if not driven by opportunistic welfare migration—in designing
welfare programs.53 Yet other commentators have used neo-Tieboutian rhetoric to describe and
analyze particular aspects of the welfare devolution debate.54

‘undesirable’ beneficiaries from other states. In fact, a race to the bottom may occur even if welfare magnet effects
are weak as long as politicians believe that they are real.”) (citing PETERSON & ROM, supra note 46).
48
For a more general overview of empirical studies of Tietoutian phenomenon, see Dowding et al., supra note 29.
49
See, e.g., Brueckner, supra note 38; ELIZABETH T. POWERS, BLOCK GRANTING WELFARE: FISCAL IMPACT ON THE
STATES (Urban Inst. 1999), available at http://www.urban.org/ElizabethTPowers; JAN K. BRUECKNER, WELFARE
REFORM AND THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (Inst. Gov’t & Pub. Aff. Working Paper #64
1998), available at http://www.igpa.uiuc.edu/publications/workingPapers.htm; David N. Figlio et al., Do States Play
Welfare Games?, 46 J. URB. ECON. 437 (1999); L. SAAVEDRA, A MODEL OF WELFARE COMPETITION WITH
EVIDENCE FROM AFDC (Inst. Gov’t & Pub. Aff. Working Paper #64 1998), available at
http://www.igpa.uiuc.edu/publications/workingPapers.htm; JAMES FOSSETT & THOMAS GAIS, A NEW PUZZLE FOR
FEDERALISM: DIFFERENT STATE RESPONSES TO MEDICAID AND FOOD STAMPS (2002), available at
http://www.rockinst.org/publications/welfare_and_jobs.html.
50
For a good overview of the several empirical studies of neo-Tieboutian assumptions in the welfare context, see
Brueckner, supra note 38, at 13-17.
51
See Note, Devolving Welfare Programs to the States: A Public Choice Perspective, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1984,
1986-87 (1996) (“Devolution—in combination with the constitutionalized ‘right to travel’—will produce economic
pressure for states to implement welfare programs that are less generous than those they would have implemented in
the absence of devolution: ‘Fearful that they will become a Mecca for the poor if their welfare programs are more
generous than those of their neighbors, states will compete in their stinginess.’”) (citations omitted).
52
See generally Shauhin A. Talesh, Note, Welfare Migration to Capture Higher Benefits: Fact or Fiction?, 32
CONN. L. REV. 675, 676, 698 (2000).
53
Id. at 698 (“‘In other words, states may in fact be influenced by changing poverty rates in deciding benefit levels,
even if there is not much welfare migration in or out of the state.’”) (quoting Sanford Schram, et al., supra note 46,
at 215; analyzing Peterson and Rom’s work).
54
See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis & Cheryl M. Miller, Welfare Waiting Periods: A Public Policy Analysis of Saenz v. Roe, 11
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 343, 344 (2000) (describing durational residency requirements under state welfare reform
programs as efforts to diminish opportunistic welfare migration); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the
Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 210 (1997) (“Congress delegates power
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Similar themes echo in the popular press. Robert Reischauer, in the Washington Post,
outlined the two sides of the debate nicely:
To the states, block grants hold out the promise of reduced federal regulation and
a chance to use Washington’s money to pay for state-designed programs that may
be better tailored to local values and conditions.
....
[But] [f]earful that they will become a Mecca for the poor if their welfare
programs are more generous than those of their neighbors, states will compete in
their stinginess.55
A 2004 editorial by the Chicago Tribune editorial board is typical of the rhetoric on the
pro-devolution side of the debate:
Welfare reform has been successful precisely because it recognized that
the federal government should get the heck out of the way and let states figure out
how best to end the culture of welfare dependency.
The law set limits on how long families could receive welfare. But it also
gave chunks of money to the states and broad discretion over how to prepare
people for the world of work.
And so, 50 experiments were born.
....
Flexibility has been the hallmark of welfare reform. States are perfectly
capable of learning from each others’ successes—and failures—thank you.56
Syndicated columnist Matthew Miller well represents the rhetoric on the anti-devolution
side of the debate—a rhetoric that amounts to the neo-Tieboutian mirror-image of the prodevolution rhetoric:
to the states, moreover, in order to satisfy preferences for state-level regulation and for state citizens’ values.”)
(citing Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority
Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 76 (1990)); Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the
Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privitization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV.
573, 583 (2004) (“Advocates for greater states’ rights and/or greater privatization gained considerable momentum at
the same time these welfare critics were demanding substantive reform. These ‘smaller government’ advocates
championed wholesale devolution and deregulation in the name of greater democracy, authenticity, choice, and
efficiency . . . .”).
55
Robert D. Reischauer, The Blockbuster Inside the Republicans’ Budget; In the Rush to Fiscal Devolution, Has
Anyone Figured Out How to Divvy Up the Cash?, WASHINGTON POST, May 14, 1995, at C2. See also David S.
Broder, Race to the Bottom?, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 6, 1995, at C9 (“Welfare programs could be tailored more
easily to local circumstances [with devolution] . . . . The critics’ fear is that instead of innovating, the states will
engage in a ‘race to the bottom’ that shreds the social safety net.”).
56
Will Congress Kill Welfare Reform?, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 2004, at C10. See also Douglas J. Besharov, There’s
More Welfare to Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A2 (arguing for greater flexibility for the states in meeting
certain work participation rates); Editorial, Race to the Top, WALL ST. J., April 2, 2004, at A8.
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Without [a federal matching fund] incentive, states will unleash a competitive
frenzy of benefit cuts, fueled by their understandable desire to be stingier than
their neighbors to avoid attracting new dependants.
Federal standards and dollars assure the neediest won’t be sacrificed in
such a “race to the bottom.”57
Because the devolution debate in academia, policy think-tanks, and the popular press is
so firmly rooted in neo-Tieboutian rhetoric, it should come as no surprise that the rhetoric of
Congress and other policy makers in the devolution debate is similarly—but perhaps even more
myopically—neo-Tieboutian in nature. The following statements by members of the House
Commerce Committee during testimony on welfare reform in 1996 well represent the polar
positions in the devolution debate on Medicaid:
Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY): The state of New York is very generous in terms of
health care. . . . . It’s kind of what I’d like to call a race to the bottom, because
many residents, who live in states who don’t cover them, will go to states that will
cover them, burdening these states, like New York, even further.
Rep. Scott L. Klug (R-WI) [question to a witness]: And rather than seeing this as
a race to the bottom, would it be your argument that what you see has given states
better flexibility—may have a race to the top? That essentially, Wisconsin,
Michigan, Virginia, Florida, could all create programs that are much more
effective and much cheaper to operate than what the federal government does?58
State flexibility was a key component of the original PRWORA,59 and the rhetoric in
Congress and the states reflected that. But in the wake of PRWORA—as Congress evaluates
welfare devolution and debates reauthorization—neo-Tieboutian rhetoric often reads like an
57

Matthew Miller, Editorial, States Would Shred the Safety Net, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, March 10, 1996, at 58A.
Hearing of the House Commerce Committee on Welfare Revision, Jun 11, 1996. See also President William J.
Clinton, Remarks by the President on Welfare Reform at the White House (Aug. 4, 1998) (“Two years ago we said
welfare reform would spark a race to independence, not a race to the bottom, and this prediction is coming true.”),
available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19980804-4271.html.
59
See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-725, at 262 (July 20, 1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2650 (Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference on the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996) (“Power and Flexibility to the States. The best welfare solutions come from those
closest to the problems—not from bureaucrats in Washington. The legislation creates broad cash welfare and child
care block grants providing maximum flexibility so that States can reform welfare in ways that are appropriate to
them, and can move families into jobs.”); See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-651, at 1-6 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2183-87 (describing the benefits of increased state flexibility, especially over waivers, because
waivers “cannot substitute for fundamental, systemic changes that empower States and local communities to make
their own decisions about how to address the needs of their populations. . . . Thus, welfare recipients are denied the
full benefit of the innovations that States are seeking to initiate.”).
58
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homage to the virtues of state flexibility, or even a competition to create the most flexible
program.60 Then-Governor Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin testified before the House
Committee on Government Reform that states did not use flexibility to race to the bottom, and
that Congress should grant states even more flexibility in meeting Maintenance of Effort
requirements and in other areas, such as health care and education.61 Representative Howard P.
McKeon argued on the House floor in support of “super-waiver” authority under the Senate’s
reauthorization bill that increased flexibility will allow states “to better coordinate” welfare
programs and “will encourage states to continue the experimentation at the state and local level
that preceded the federal welfare reform action in 1996.”62 Even the General Accounting Office,
in its testimony before a House committee, couched its supportive statements in terms of neoTieboutian language of “state flexibility,” experimentation, and interstate competition.63
The National Governors Association asserted its continued support for devolution of
welfare because “[t]he TANF block grant has provided Governors the flexibility to implement
innovative welfare reform programs based on work requirements and time limits, along with the
ability to use TANF funds to provide needed work supports for low-income working families.”64

60

See generally 148 CONG. REC. H2517 (May 16, 2002) (Debate on the Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family
Promotion Act of 2002) (reflecting debate on whether welfare reform reauthorization proposals offer enough
flexibility to the states).
61
National Problems, Local Solutions: Federalism at Work. Part III, Welfare Reform is Working: A Report on State
and Local Initiatives: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 23 (1999) (statement of
Tommy G. Thompson, Governor of Wisconsin).
62
149 CONG. REC. E188, E189 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2003) (statement of Rep. McKeon).
63
Implementation of Welfare Reform Work Requirements and Time Limits: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Res. of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 6-69 (2002) (statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni,
Managing Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues of the General Accounting Office); U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: OUTCOMES FOR TANF RECIPIENTS WITH IMPAIRMENTS (July
2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/date.php.
64
National Governors Association, Policy Position HHS-21, Welfare Reform Policy 21.1 (formerly HR-36;
effective Winter Meeting 2003-Winter Meeting 2005), at
http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,C_POLICY_POSITION^D_554,00.html.
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The NGA has argued for additional flexibility in a variety of areas when Congress reauthorizes
the PRWORA.65
The opposition to welfare devolution is more muted in Congress, but, again, it is framed
in neo-Tieboutian rhetoric. In arguing against unfettered devolution of Medicaid in 1995,
Senator Graham used a neo-Tieboutian argument to support a proposal for a per capita cap
approach to protect vulnerable Medicaid recipients from a race to the bottom in the Medicaid
program.66 In commenting on welfare devolution in the wake of President Clinton’s veto of
earlier welfare reform legislation, Senator Moynihan made his position on welfare devolution via
a blockgrant clear:
First, it is widely assumed that AFDC is a Federal entitlement that the Federal
Government can restrain without relinquishing. It is not. There is no Federal
entitlement to welfare for individuals. Each State devises its own program. The
Federal Government provides a matching grant. Abolish the matching grant and
you can reasonably expect a race to the bottom.67
Thus, both sides of the debate about the form of federal-state relationships captured in the
PRA framed their rhetoric around state experimentation and interstate competition, although they
come down with very different conclusions. Supporters of the PRA argued that devolution
would permit states to “experiment” to respond to local needs, desires, and conditions, and to
compete with each other to provide an optimal level of benefits. And opponents of the PRA
argued that devolution would result in a “race-to-the-bottom” among states, who would design
welfare policies that would drive away their own poor and discourage opportunistic welfare
migration from other states.

65

Id. at 36.3.
141 CONG. REC. S16845, S16847 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Graham) (“Per capita cap legislation
is our way out of the race to the bottom and is our ticket to a 21st century that maintains an American Federal-State
stake in the health and welfare of its citizens.”).
67
142 CONG. REC. S115, S116 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
66
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This polarized debate about jurisdictional competition—and specifically about the
mobility assumption, or opportunistic welfare migration—apparently led Congress to erect a
kind of migration barrier in the PRWORA by permitting—but, notably, not requiring—states to
provide immigrants from other states only the (lower) level of benefit that they would have
received in their former state of residence for a period not to exceed 12 months.68 The purpose
of this provision was to prevent opportunistic welfare migration 69 while not running afoul of
Shapiro v. Thompson.70
Several state legislatures, evidently concerned about opportunistic welfare migration as
part of their enactments of relatively generous welfare packages under their welfare reform
plans, 71 took up proposals to erect the migration barrier permitted under § 604(c) as part of their
new plans. 72 Debates about these initiatives were consistently framed in the neo-Tieboutian
rhetoric of state experimentation, interstate jurisdictional competition, and, specifically,
opportunistic welfare migration. California provides a good, representative case study, because
its migration barrier was in many ways archetypal and because it became the subject of Saenz v.
Roe,73 discussed below.
California’s migration barrier read as follows:

68

42 U.S.C. § 604(c) (2000) (stating that states “may apply to a family the rules (including benefit amounts) of the
program funded under this part of another State if the family has moved to the State from the other State and has
resided in the State for less than twelve months.”).
69
H.R. REP. NO. 104-651, at 1339 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2369.
70
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that state welfare statutes imposing a one-year residency requirement prior to
awarding benefits under the AFDC program violate the Equal Protection Clause).
71
Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 520 n.14 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (citing and quoting legislative history of the
California statute).
72
Brief of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al, in Support of Petitioners at 14, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999) (No. 98-97). Subsequently, in the wake of PRWORA, California implemented the provision. The courts
again held it to be unconstitutional. Roe v. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 134 F.3d 1400 (9th
Cir. 1998), aff’d sub nom. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
At the time of the Saenz case, 12 states had adopted two-tiered residency requirements, and seven had been
enjoined by the courts. Brief of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al, in Support of Petitioners at 14, Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (No. 98-97).
73
526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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Notwithstanding the maximum aid payments specified in paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of Section 11450, families that have resided in this state for less
than 12 months shall be paid an amount calculated in accordance with paragraph
(1) of subdivision (a) of Section 11450, not to exceed the maximum aid payment
that would have been received by that family from the state of prior residence.74
California originally sought to implement this statute in 1992, before the enactment of the
PRWORA, as a waiver under its AFDC program.75 Its implementation was enjoined, however,
because it was held unconstitutional by a state court.76 The Supreme Court later vacated the case
as non-ripe, because the waiver was under review in a separate case.77
In the wake of the PRWORA, however, California implemented this same provision.78
The rhetoric surrounding the original proposition and waiver request and later implementation
was couched largely in language deriving from the mobility assumption. California’s original
waiver request justified its “relocation grant” program in terms of “reduc[ing] the incentive for
families to migrate to California for the purpose of obtaining higher aid payments.”79 The
California Legislative Analyst Report on the proposal to create a “two-tier” system examined the
research on opportunistic welfare migration (offering no solid conclusions for the California
program), stating that
[t]wo-tier proposals have surfaced in other states; generally where the AFDC or
[general assistance] grants are high compared to surrounding states. The concern
driving these policy proposals is that people receiving assistance in low-benefit
states are encouraged to move to high-benefit states in order to take advantage of

74

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, § 11450.03 (West 2001).
Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor, California, to Jo Anne Barnhart, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Heath and
Human Services (May 19, 1992) (California’s Proposition 165 Waiver Request), in Joint Appendix 45-49, Saenz
(No. 98-97).
76
Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993), aff’d, 26 F.3d 95 (9th Cir. 1994).
77
Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that the appeal to the Supreme Court was not ripe, because, in
parallel litigation, plaintiffs challenged the Secretary’s approval of the waiver). The separate case is Beno v.
Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994).
78
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, § 11450.03 (West 2001).
79
Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor, California, to Jo Anne Barnhart, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Heath and
Human Services (May 19, 1992) (California’s Proposition 165 Waiver Request), in Joint Appendix 45 & 48, Saenz
(No. 98-97).
75
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the higher benefit. In effect, the high-benefit state becomes a so-called ‘welfare
magnet.’ Two-tier grants are thought to mitigate migration incentives.80
And members in the California Assembly floor debate—both pro-barrier and anti-barrier—used
rhetoric derived from the mobility assumption, liberally to justify positions for and against the
measure.81
As mentioned above, these migration barrier measures were challenged at the United
States Supreme Court in Saenz v. Roe.82 Although the legal issues in this case were framed in
terms of right to travel, a consistent theme in the rhetoric of the parties, amici, and courts
revolved around state experimentation and interstate jurisdictional competition, specifically
around the mobility assumption. For example, in Saenz, the defendant’s consistent and stated
interest in adopting this policy was to deter opportunistic welfare migration.83 Amici also used
opportunistic welfare migration as the basis for arguments for and against this provision.84 The
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Letter from Elizabeth G. Hill, Legislative Analyst, California Legislature, to Charles W. Quackenbush, Assembly
Member, California Legislature (Dec. 19, 1991) (Legislative Analyst Report To Assemblymember Quackenbush), in
Joint Appendix 51-52, Saenz (No. 98-97).
81
California Assembly Floor Debate and Vote on SB 366 (Mar. 9, 1992), in Joint Appendix 63-74, Saenz (No. 9897). For example, Mr. Costa said:
Realizing that in fact funds are short in California today, it makes a great deal of sense
then to insure that incentives are provided for people from other parts of the country, in fact that
who might be lured to California if in fact there is evidence to make that case, that people might be
willing to come here for the purpose—to benefit from higher assistance. This legislation attempts
to take care of that by requiring a one year residency requirement in California for anyone to
benefit from the level of assistance that we now provide for people who are residents of
California.
Id. at 63. On the other side of the debate, Mr. Bates argued: “[Immigrants from other states] are not coming here
for any perceived welfare benefit increases that they somehow or other could get by coming to California. So we
are deceiving ourselves if we think somehow or other people are coming to California for welfare benefits.” Id. at
64.
82
526 U.S. 489 (1999).
83
Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 522 n.14 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (citing and quoting legislative history of the
California statute); Roe v. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. 977, 982-83 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (reviewing the parties’ evidence on
welfare migration and the “welfare magnet” hypothesis); Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“At oral argument before this court, in response to the suggestion that the purpose of § 11450.03 is to keep poor
people out of the state, the state conceded that it does not want people to move to California ‘with a mind-set of
economic dependency.’”).
84
Brief of Social Scientists as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Saenz (No. 98-97); Brief for William Cohen,
et al., Amici Curiae, Supporting Respondents at 15-18, Saenz (No. 98-97); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners in Part and Respondents in Part at 13-20, Saenz (No. 98-97) (discussing opportunistic
welfare migration and the “welfare magnet” hypothesis, and arguing that 42 U.S.C. § 602(c) was enacted to help
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courts consistently held that this interest was insufficient and thus that the state statute was
unconstitutional.85
Similarly, in Maldonado v. Houstoun,86 the plaintiffs challenged a similar statute under
Pennsylvania law.87 The plaintiffs argued that a primary purpose of enacting the law was to
deter opportunistic welfare migration.88 The district court found that, while this was only a
secondary purpose of the law, the statute was nevertheless unconstitutional.89 The circuit court,
too, recognized that deterring opportunistic welfare migration was one purpose of the statute,
and, in a summary statement, found that purpose “clearly unconstitutional.”90

mitigate the effects of opportunistic welfare migration); Brief of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al, in
Support of Petitioners at 15-18, Saenz (No. 98-97).
85
Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516, 520, 521-22 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (“If the purpose of the measure is to deter
migration by poor people into the State, and it appears that this may be the purpose, then the measure must be
unconstitutional.”) (footnote omitted); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (“These classifications may not be
justified by a purpose to deter welfare applicants from migrating to California for three reasons.”); Legislative
Analyst Report to Assembly Quackenbush (Dec. 9, 1991) (in Saenz Joint Appendix to Supreme Court); California
Assembly Floor Debate and Vote on SB 366 (March 9, 1992) (in Saenz Joint Appendix to Supreme Court);
Declaration of Joel F. Handler (in Saenz Joint Appendix to Supreme Court); Declaration of John Hartman (in Saenz
Joint Appendix to Supreme Court).
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Part III: Sorting Principles
The neo-Tieboutian model, with its almost exclusive emphasis on the mobility
assumption, leads to one of two polar conclusions: welfare ought to be (completely) devolved to
the states to promote experimentation and responsiveness to local needs and desires or welfare
ought to be (completely) federal to prevent “race-to-the-bottom” and “welfare magnet” effects.
But these two positions clearly do not occupy the entire field of possibilities for welfare
federalism—they are merely poles on a unidimensional continuum. To realize the full richness
of federalism possibilities, we must diversify the debate and consider principles outside the
narrow mobility assumption to help sort out the appropriate roles for the federal and state
governments in the design and delivery of welfare programs.
This section thus seeks to introduce some candidates for diversified sorting principles in
the devolution debate. The section considers two broad categories of sorting principles: those
that are endogenous to Tiebout’s original model; and those that are exogenous to the original
model. The former category attempts to illustrate the paucity of considerations in the current
debate even within the limited world of the Tiebout model. I attempt to show that the neoTiebotian debate, simply by considering other assumptions within the Tiebout model itself, could
enrich the array of options for welfare federalism immeasurably.91
The latter category attempts to illustrate the even greater paucity of considerations in the
current debate given the universe of options outside the Tiebout model. These exogenous sorting
principles of political participation, community, and equality and justice seek to fill gaps in the
narrow economic analysis of the Tiebout model and provide an even richer array of welfare
dependency”—was also unconstitutional, under a strict scrutiny test. Id. It is beyond the scope of this article to
explore the appropriate level of scrutiny applied in “right to travel” cases; the point here is only that interstate
jurisdictional competition language has become an entrenched part of the rhetoric.
91
That they have not is curious. For example, why does the neo-Tieboutian debate focus almost exclusively on the
mobility assumption, rather than some other assumption within the model, such as the knowledge assumption?
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federalism possibilities. The result is an exploration of potential factors to help sort out the
complex and appropriate roles for federal and state governments in welfare.
This list, then, represents mere candidates for additional federalism sorting principles.
This list is neither necessarily complete nor exhaustive; it simply represents potential additional
considerations in the devolution debate. Moreover, my analysis of these principles does not
necessarily point to any particular role for the federal or state governments, although it
occasionally does. My intent here is not to provide specific answers, but only to raise questions.
My modest hope is that these sorting principles will spawn new research, more diverse debate,
and richer possibilities for welfare federalism.
A.

Endogenous Sorting Principles
Considering that the devolution debate seems so deeply rooted in Tiebout’s model and its

neo-Tieboutian cousin, jurisdictional competition, it is surprising that the debate fails to consider
Tiebout’s knowledge assumption and externalities as sorting principles, alongside the mobility
assumption. As discussed below, Tiebout himself seemed to argue that the knowledge
assumption was as critical to his model as the mobility assumption. And consideration of
externalities is a stand-by in federalism debates in other areas of public policy, most notably the
environment. The knowledge assumption and externalities seem to be critical elements in a
consideration of federalism under Tieboutian assumptions; this section attempts to sketch out the
implications of including them as sorting principles for welfare federalism. Although I draw no
specific conclusions, it is clear that including these considerations in the devolution debate
results in a much richer array of possibilities for welfare federalism. This section also suggests
that the mobility assumption should remain a principle—but merely one of several—in the
devolution debate.
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1.

The Knowledge Assumption

The omission of considerations relating to the knowledge assumption from the devolution
debate is curious, considering that Tiebout himself seemed to place it on par with the mobility
assumption. Tiebout wrote:
Policies that promote residential mobility and increase the knowledge of
the consumer-voter will improve the allocation of government expenditures in the
same sense that mobility among jobs and knowledge relevant to the location of
industry and labor improve the allocation of private resources.92
The statement reflects a truism: citizens cannot make meaningful residential decisions based on
a comparison of tax-benefit packages among jurisdictions without knowledge of those taxbenefit packages. Full knowledge is an important consideration in Tiebout’s original model; it is
also an important consideration in any jurisdictional competition or neo-Tieboutian model; it
ought to be a consideration in the devolution debate.
The question from the government perspective in the devolution debate is: What level of
government is best situated to provide information about welfare programs to citizens and
potential citizens? Each individual state enjoys a comparative advantage in describing and
publicizing its own program, and the states therefore may be in a good position to inform the
citizenry within their own state and within other states. But if citizens really vote with their feet,
as both sides of the devolution debate seem to assume, states’ incentives to provide information
about their programs depend on their desire to attract or repel citizens. For example, under neoTieboutian assumptions, states with relatively stingy programs have strong incentives to
publicize their programs: they want to disseminate information about their programs within their
boundaries to repel their own poor and outside their boundaries to discourage opportunistic
welfare migration and to attract nonpoor citizens of other states. On the other hand, again under
92

Tiebout, supra note 14, at 423.
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neo-Tieboutian assumptions, states with relatively generous programs have a strong disincentive
to publicize their programs, at least outside their own borders, in order not to encourage
opportunistic welfare migration. Neo-Tieboutian assumptions may also encourage some states to
publicize their programs inaccurately. Because states will always offer different welfare
packages, there will always be incentives for states to variously publicize their programs: some
will publicize more and accurately; others will publicize less and inaccurately. It seems
therefore that there is a role for a central repository and publisher of information about various
states’ welfare programs; the federal government is well situated to play this role.
But there are other reasons, unrelated to jurisdictional competition, for governments to
publicize their welfare programs. For example, publicity allows governments to better and more
clearly articulate and reflect their community values.93 Publicity allows governments to share
information about various program approaches and results. And publicity allows citizens to
register their preferences through more traditional forms of democratic participation, such as
voting and advocacy.94 These benefits to publicity may point in different directions with regard
to welfare federalism; they ought to be a part of the devolution debate so that we can sort them
out.
The question from the citizen and recipient perspective in the debate is: What level of
government can best promote the capabilities among citizens and recipients to gain full
information about welfare programs? The question implicates a host of democratic
institutions—most notably public education—designed to promote and enable democratic and
economic capabilities and functionings. It is well beyond the scope of this article to consider
issues of federalism in institutions such as public education, but the existing location of these
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See infra.
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institutions in our federal system may help us better understand how to sort federal and state
responsibilities in promoting knowledge of welfare programs.
It seems clear that knowledge and publicity are important considerations for welfare
federalism, whether under neo-Tieboutian assumptions or not. The various reasons for
knowledge and publicity may point us in different directions with regard to welfare federalism:
some reasons may point toward state responsibility for publicity and the promotion of
capabilities among citizens to understand the dimensions of welfare programs; others may point
in the direction of federal responsibility. Still other considerations related to knowledge and
publicity may demand an information analog to the federal migration barrier overruled in
Saenz—something like a federal transparency requirement that might require states and local
governments to collect and disseminate particular kinds of information about welfare programs
for the purpose of educating the public. The point is merely that these considerations may yield
a richer array of options for welfare federalism, and that they ought to be a part of the devolution
debate.
2.

Externalities

A second curious omission from the devolution debate relates to externalities.
Consideration of externalities is critical in any economic analysis of federalism, and externalities
play a central role in federalism debates in other areas of public policy, most notably the
environment.95 But the welfare devolution debate has been largely devoid of considerations of
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externalities; as a result, the debate has failed to consider a critical element in sorting out federal
and state responsibilities for welfare programs. Externalities ought to be a part of the debate.
Externalities in the welfare context are interstate economic effects of various state
welfare programs and mobile welfare recipients. Under a devolved welfare scheme—and
especially under a scheme like PRWORA, which emphasizes the economic functions of welfare
through work requirements—economic effects of welfare programs and welfare recipients
themselves may spill over between jurisdictions. In fact, under jurisdictional competition
assumptions, we expect spill-over in the form of opportunistic welfare migration. As PRWORA
takes root, we may observe other, even unanticipated forms of spill-over and externalities in
economic harms and benefits between states. For a variety of reasons, states may lack the
capabilities to internalize these spill-over effects, and, as some environmental scholars have
argued,96 we may need to look to the federal government to cushion the impact of externalities
between states.
The federal migration barrier at issue in Saenz seems an implicit recognition of this point:
the migration barrier was designed to prevent prophylactically a spill-over in welfare
recipients.97 Under Saenz, of course, there is no longer a federal prophylactic measure to deal
with externalities. The devolution debate ought therefore to consider other, remedial and
compensatory roles for the federal government in cushioning the effects of externalities between
states.
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See Butler & Macey, supra note 95, at 42 (“If nontrivial external costs are imposed across political boundaries,
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It is unclear what role externalities play in devolved welfare programs, but it is clear that
Congress was sufficiently concerned about one form of spill-over—opportunistic welfare
migration—that it enacted a prophylactic measure to mitigate its effects. Having lost that tool to
deal with spill-over in Saenz, Congress now ought to reconsider the role of externalities and their
mitigation. More generally, the devolution debate ought to consider issues of externalities in
welfare—what they are, how to measure them, and how to deal with them—in sorting out the
appropriate division of responsibilities between the federal and state governments.
3.

The Mobility Assumption

Finally, we ought to reconsider the mobility assumption in the devolution debate.
Unfortunately—and despite the amount of discussion and research about it—the most we can say
is that we do not really know whether opportunistic welfare migration exists or to what extent it
impacts state welfare programs.98 The mobility assumption ought to remain a part of the debate,
at least to the extent that we continue to examine how and why people migrate from state to
state. But it ought to be merely one of several sorting principles—not the sole sorting
principle—for welfare federalism.
Including the knowledge assumption and externalities alongside the mobility assumption
as three endogenous sorting principles thus results in a more complex set of possibilities for
welfare federalism. These endogenous considerations seem obvious considering their
importance in Tiebout’s original model; their inclusion here serves to illustrate the paucity of
considerations in the current debate and to illustrate some of the possibilities for a richer
98
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federalism. These points are underscored by considering candidates for exogenous sorting
principles.
B.

Exogenous Sorting Principles
The myopia of the current debate becomes even more acute if we consider sorting

principles outside the Tiebout model. These principles—political participation, community, and
equality and justice—are designed to include considerations beyond those merely economic in
the devolution debate and thus fill clear gaps in the neo-Tieboutian assumptions and rhetoric.
This section seeks to sketch out these three principles and some of the federalism implications
that may flow from them.
1.

Political Participation

One of the key problems with the neo-Tieboutian rhetoric is that it fails to account for the
poor as civic actors and citizens in a democracy. The jurisdictional competition model
contemplates that citizens, including the poor, register preferences exclusively via migration—
that citizens vote with their feet. It further assumes that governments respond to citizen
preferences, as expressed exclusively through migratory patterns, by offering tax-benefit
packages that attract an optimal level of citizens. In this marketplace for public goods, policy
simply reflects the equilibrium tax-benefit packages that the government-sellers negotiate with
the citizen-buyers. And the buyers’ exclusive leverage in this negotiation is their power to walk
away—to redirect their tax resources to a jurisdiction that better meets their tax-benefit
preferences. Individuals in this model—and especially poor individuals, who lack the same, or
perhaps any, leverage to walk away—are not full citizens, with all the attendant rights and duties
in a democracy; instead, they are mere economic actors in a game of jurisdictional competition.
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The neo-Tieboutian rhetoric of the devolution debate strips individuals, particularly the
poor, of their identity as diverse citizens and instead considers only their economic choices in the
market for public goods as a proxy for their preferences for public goods. It does this by failing
to account for the myriad alternative, non-economic ways of registering preferences in our
democracy. For example, jurisdictional competition theory fails to account adequately for the
roles of voting, participating, and aggregating preferences through interest group politics in
registering preferences and shaping policy. Most simply, it assumes that if an individual resides
within a jurisdiction, that individual’s residence alone registers a preference for the tax-benefit
package offered in the jurisdiction, even if the individual consistently votes against and
advocates against the jurisdiction’s policies. Rather than considering citizens as voters, active
participants, or interest group members, jurisdictional competition theory treats individuals only
as economic beings, ignoring the civic identities of citizens and the tools available to them to
influence policy in a democracy.
Because the theory fails to account for individuals’ civic identities, it also fails to account
for civic differences. The theory fails to consider the many individual and group characteristics
that contribute to civic inequality, e.g., race, gender, age, class, and geographic location, just to
name a few. Instead, by neutralizing individuals’ civic identities, the theory equalizes those
identities: by holding civic identity constant and considering individuals only in an economic
space, the theory holds not only that civic identity, but also civic difference, is irrelevant in
predicting and fashioning policy. For example, the theory treats voting- and non-voting
individuals in the same jurisdiction as each registering the same preference, irrespective of their
votes and their civic inequality, solely by virtue of their residence within the jurisdiction.
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By failing to consider civic identity and civic inequality, the theory thus allows economic
identity to crowd out civic identity,99 as if economic decisions in a jurisdictional competition
world were a perfect proxy for preferences expressed through the more conventional channel of
civic engagement. The simple examples above, and countless real-world experiences, illustrate
that economic decisions are not such a close proxy, and the policy predictions in the
jurisdictional competition model are therefore imperfect. Thus by failing to account for civic
identity, jurisdictional competition theory can only predict, at best, a very imperfect equilibrium
tax-benefit package for any jurisdiction, because it ignores other important civic factors that
contribute to policy development.
Moreover, jurisdictional competition theory fails to account for economic inequalities.
By ignoring inequalities, the theory seems to equalize individuals across classes, failing to
account for the disparate impact on policy development among individuals or groups of different
means. For example, the theory seems to predict that an individual of modest means registers his
or her preferences via migration—and thus influences policy—as strongly as an individual of
considerable means. This simply cannot be the case: under a pure economic model, such as the
jurisdictional competition model, a relatively wealthy individual can always influence the market
more than a relatively poor individual, because local jurisdictions benefit more from wealthy
individuals. Jurisdictional competition fails to account for the different abilities to register
preferences and influence policy that must result with market actors of different means; it thus
fails to predict an accurate equilibrium tax-benefit package.
The failure of the theory to account for civic identities and civic and economic
inequalities particularly skews the model on issues of redistribution to the poor. First, because
99
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the poor, by definition, lack resources and means, they are unable to register preferences in a
jurisdictional competition world as strongly as others with means: migration of the poor in order
to express a preference registers much lower than migration of the rich, because the poor are
relatively less desirable and important to local jurisdictions. But the jurisdictional competition
theory seems not to distinguish between poor and rich in predicting an equilibrium tax-benefit
package based on individuals’ migratory patterns. It thus overstates the influence of the poor in
registering preferences and provides an imperfect predictor of policy.
Alternatively, we might consider the poor in their role as beneficiaries of public largess,
not as taxpaying individuals. We encounter a similar limitation in the jurisdictional competition
theory, but here it understates the influence of the poor. This alternative assumes that states treat
the poor solely as a drag on the public fisc, not as preference-registering taxpayers. This ignores
the jurisdictional competition methods that even the poor register preferences, for example, by
paying sales taxes. The jurisdictional competition model thus understates the influence of the
poor in registering preferences under this alternative. The point here, of course, is not to attempt
to quantify the ability of the poor to register (or not) preferences as compared to the rich; rather,
the point is simply to discuss the inherent mismatch between the jurisdictional competition
predictions and actual policy as a result of the theory’s failure to account for economic
differences.
Next, by ignoring the ability of the poor to register preferences through political
engagement, the jurisdictional competition model fails to predict their registration of preferences.
Because the poor generally have a diminished ability to influence policy through civic
engagement, the theory, by neutralizing and equalizing civic identity, tends to overstate the
impact of the poor on policy development. By focusing exclusively on migration as the vehicle
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with which to express preferences, the theory assumes away any civic vehicle for expressing
preferences. But these civic vehicles are likely to be employed relatively effectively by the nonpoor, and they are likely to be employed relatively ineffectively, if at all, by the poor. By
equalizing the poor and the non-poor in civic space, jurisdictional competition overstates the
impact of the poor on policy.
Consider, for example, the many public debates about welfare reform—including the
devolution debate—and the conspicuous absence of voices in those debates of the poor. Welfare
reform policy is shaped by academics, policy analysts, and primarily policy-makers, but certainly
not the poor. The poor have a relative and profound disadvantage in registering policy
preferences through political channels. By ignoring this reality—and by assuming that every
individual has an equal opportunity to register preferences through (and only through)
migration—jurisdictional competition theory tends to overstate the impact of the poor on policy.
It therefore provides an imperfect model for predicting an equilibrium tax-benefit package.
Jurisdictional competition theory thus reduces individuals to their economic beings and
considers them only in an economic space. Because it ignores important differences in civic
space that impact the development of policy, its predictions must be imperfect or subject to
qualification.
The devolution debate, therefore, ought to include considerations of political
participation. At a minimum, the debate should consider how the neo-Tieboutian predictions
need to be adjusted to account for the political and civic ways in which all citizens register their
preferences. For example, the debate should consider the following questions: How does the
relative lack of political power of the poor distort the jurisdictional competition predictions?
How does the relative political influence of the rich distort these predictions? At what levels of
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government do the poor and the rich have comparative advantages in registering their
preferences via political engagement?
The answers to these and other, related questions will result in one of two situations.
First, as is most likely, we may discover that jurisdictional competition overvalues the local
political influence of the poor by ignoring political influence. In other words, by failing to
account for relative differences in local political influence (and thus by equating political
influence of the poor with influence of the rich), the model overstates the influence of the poor.
By including political participation as a new variable in a grander model, the new model may
thus predict an even greater desire among the states to cut welfare benefits—greater, that is, than
states’ desire under “race to the bottom.” Absent some kind of local political equalizing
mechanism—and in order to offset local political disparities—this new model may thus argue in
favor of retaining greater federal control over levels of benefits, administrative access to benefits,
requirements for the receipt of benefits, and other elements of benefits programs that states may
tend to cut or restrict, given the even lesser ability of the poor to register preferences through
conventional political channels.
Alternatively, as seems less likely, we may discover that jurisdictional competition
undervalues local political participation among the poor and local (as opposed to national)
support for public welfare programs. Perhaps citizens register a greater degree of support for
these programs at the local level than the model predicts. If this is the case, the model may
underestimate the degree to which states match citizen preferences for these programs, and “race
to the bottom” rhetoric may be overstated, or at least imprecise. This result may argue in favor
of policies that promote freer migration at the state and federal levels—or at least against
migration barriers, notwithstanding the fact that the Court in Saenz found them

41

unconstitutional—because concerns about the drawbacks of free migration are overstated, and
states well match citizen preferences.
Under either scenario, there are important policy implications given the adjustments to
the neo-Tieboutian predictions based on a political analysis. The exact effects of the ability of
the poor to register preferences through the political process are not clear100—more work needs
to be done to tease out these issues—but it is clear that a neo-Tieboutian model fails to fully
encompass the distorting effects of poverty on policy development. Political participation
therefore ought to be a part of the devolution debate in order to help sort out the appropriate roles
for federal and state governments in welfare programs.
2.

Community

Community is another notably absent term in the lexicon of the devolution debate, and, in
many ways, it is closely related to civic participation. The neo-Tieboutian debate thus ignores
the poor as members of community. The idea of community in the context of welfare federalism
asks: Through which level of government do we best reflect our community values relating to
welfare? Is the expression of values relating to public welfare part of our national community
identity? Or is it constituent of our state community identity? More simply: Which “we”—the
national “we” or the state “we”—defines the relevant community for purposes of welfare
programs? Are there particular and discrete aspects of welfare that are more closely associated
with our national or state community identities?101
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Historically, welfare programs have accounted for questions of community: these
programs have been designed to address particular community problems at the local community
level or at the national community level or both. History thus provides some insights. For
example, in the period of American history prior to the New Deal, welfare and poor relief were a
matter of local concern. By the mid 19th century, local communities had long provided “outdoor
relief”—assistance to poor and destitute people in their homes. In addition, some poor were
auctioned to local farmers, and others—strangers to the local community—were expelled from
the town. By 1850, specialized residential institutions began to spring up in local communities.
These were designed to cut off the poor from corrupting influences that led to their poverty in the
first place, to rehabilitate the poor by transforming behavior and personalities, and to inculcate
habits and ethics of work.102
These earlier forms of welfare thus located their nuclei in the local community. This
made some sense from a communitarian perspective: given the close identification and affiliation
that citizens at the time had with their more local spheres of community, local control over
welfare programs would seem to best reflect and promote the values of citizens’ primary
communities. Local communities were the primary site of citizens’ economic, civic, and social
activities,103 and local communities exhibited a relatively greater level of cohesion and stickiness
for both poor and non-poor citizens.104 Individuals associated with their local communities and
the local poor mostly associated with the national community or the poor in distant communities.
Their reaction to poverty on a local level was a reflection of their local community values
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(whatever we think about those values today). Because poverty was a local problem, local
community solutions would best reflect the relevant local community values.
The post-New Deal welfare programs, in contrast, located their nuclei in the national
community. This also made some sense: poverty was increasingly becoming a nationalized
issue, and the national community was best situated to address it. The increasingly nationalized
causes of poverty—e.g., the Great Depression and other nationalized causes of economic
fluctuations and poverty—demanded a response by the federal community.105 Moreover,
increased intra-state migration and increased channels of intra-state communications resulted in a
relative rise in the importance of broader spheres of community,106 outside the more pedestrian
local communities. And a 20th century marked by major events of a national, not state or local,
scale helped create a broader federal community in which national values and sentiments
trumped state and local values and sentiments, especially in economic and security matters.107
Poverty thus became a relatively national problem within the national community.
The nationalized nature of poverty that gave rise to post-New Deal welfare programs has
not dissipated. And our national community sentiments, especially as they relate to economic
matters, have only increased in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Poverty and welfare are
issues of concern for our national community. At the same time, local communities remain
deeply involved in issues related to poverty and welfare, and local community sentiments ought
to be accounted for.
In addition to considering these positive historical trends about community and welfare,
we ought to also deal with the normative questions about the kinds of communities we wish to
form on the national, state, and local levels. For example, do we wish support for our poor to be
105
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a part of our national community identity? Should it be limited to the identities of state and local
communities? Or perhaps we seek some more sophisticated balance that permits support to be
constituent of each community. There are, of course, scores of related questions and issues. My
purpose here is not to delineate them and certainly not to answer them. Rather, I mean only to
suggest that these questions and issues ought to be a part of the devolution debate.
3.

Equality and Justice

Finally, questions of equality and justice are present in the devolution debate only by
virtue of their presence in the broader, substantive debates about welfare reform. For example,
the issue of federal entitlement has been an important part of the broader welfare reform debate.
The federal entitlement protected some measure of equality and justice by ensuring certain
federal standards in welfare programs across states and local jurisdictions. But the narrower
devolution debate is rarely couched in terms of entitlement, federal or state. Here, I do not
intend to focus narrowly on issues related to entitlement; instead I intend to raise questions of
equality and justice as they relate to larger questions about the appropriate levels of government
to preserve these principles, through entitlement or otherwise. These questions are, of course,
closely related to issues of community, as part of the questions ask: Which communities—
federal, state, or local—value which kinds of equality and which kinds of justice?
Begin with the less controversial issue of equality: What level of government best
preserves equality across state and local jurisdictions in the allocation and administration of
welfare programs? Consider two welfare recipients in different state or local jurisdictions and
subject to different welfare benefits and administrative schemes. Under a devolved system, one
recipient might receive lower benefits, be subject to higher or more onerous requirements, and be
subject to greater administrative barriers than the other recipient from a different jurisdiction.
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We might observe differences like this even under a system of “adjusted equality” that accounts
for legitimate variances in local conditions, such as differences in local costs of living. Prodevolutionists claim that such disparate treatment is a reflection of local considerations, while
anti-devolutionists claim that it is evidence of a “race to the bottom.” But neither side seems to
consider the differences in the context of federalism: Which level of government is best suited to
define and preserve equality, or adjusted equality, across jurisdictions?108
If equality is an important consideration at the state level of government or community—
i.e., equality across welfare programs within the state—perhaps states are best suited to define
and preserve equality within their borders (for they have no direct control over programs outside
their borders). Inequality may arise within states that practice “double devolution,” or further
devolution of welfare program functions downward away from the state government and toward
local governments, thus creating an environment where inequalities across local jurisdictions
within a state are possible or even likely. Equality minded states may seek to equalize benefit
levels, program requirements, and administrative burdens across local jurisdictions based on
some formula that accounts for local costs of living, local economic conditions, and the like. In
fact, states, as entities closest to the local governments and the local situations, may have a
comparative advantage over the federal government in acting as the equalizing force. But under
a block-grant form of federalism that caps federal funding and penalizes states for failing to meet
standards such as work participation rates, states lack financial incentives to promote equality.
Moreover, as the entities closest to the local governments and local situations, states may be
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I use here a simple and relatively non-controversial definition of equality, adjusted for local situations: Similarly
situated individuals ought not to be treated significantly differently in welfare programs, after accounting for local
variations in such things as cost of living, local economies, and the like. Of course, this leaves much open to debate.
But that is exactly the point: these issues ought to be a part of the debate.
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more receptive to political considerations that actually promote inequality. Thus, the federal
government may have a comparative advantage as the equalizing force in these situations.
If equality is an important consideration at the federal level—i.e., equality in programs
across states—the federal government clearly has a comparative advantage in defining and
preserving it. Consider a state that underfunds its welfare program or imposes harsher
requirements relative to programs in other states, thus raising equality issues across states. The
relatively stingier state has no financial incentive to increase funding under a block-grant
devolution system, and it has no direct control over the programs in other states. Neither can
other states directly impact the behavior of the stingier state; only the federal government can
provide the incentives to promote equality.
Consider alternatively a state that overfunds its welfare program or relaxes its
requirements relative to programs in other states. Presumably, a relatively generous state
behaves thus for a reason—community values, historical norms, or economic or political
considerations unique to that state—and these considerations outweigh the financial benefit to
the state in providing less generous programs. Given this calculation, the relatively generous
state is unlikely to reduce benefits out of equality concerns for recipients in other states. And
less generous states have no incentive to increase their own benefits to promote equality with the
generous state. No state can directly impact the behavior of any other state to promote equality;
again, only the federal government can provide incentives to promote equality between states.
States, by their nature, lack the capabilities of dealing with these equality issues in
welfare programs within and across states; the federal government seems to have a comparative
advantage in this arena. But I do not mean to imply that states ought not to play a role in
defining and promoting equality within states or among states. I mean only to suggest that
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equality definitions and standards ought to be considerations in the devolution debate to allow
that debate to sort these considerations out.
Next consider the more controversial issue of justice, defined more generally than
equality: What level of government is best situated to define and promote standards of justice
and fairness in welfare programs? Consider first procedural justice, or fairness as it relates to the
process of applying for and receiving benefits. Certainly a component of procedural justice is
relative fairness, or equality, discussed above in general terms. But another component of
procedural justice is objective fairness of process, i.e., a fair process for any recipient, or a bare
minimum standard, irrespective of equality considerations.109 Because welfare programs at issue
in this paper, devolved or not, are generally jointly funded by the federal and state governments,
it seems reasonable that both federal and state governments would assert an interest in objective
procedural fairness and that both levels of government ought therefore to establish and enforce
such standards.
Consider next substantive justice, or fairness in the benefit level and program
requirements such as work requirements. Like procedural justice, substantive justice contains an
element of relative fairness, or equality, discussed above in general terms. But it also contains an
element of objective fairness in the level of benefits, i.e., an objectively fair level of benefits (a
bare minimum) and fair requirements (maxima, perhaps), irrespective of equality. States may
enjoy a comparative advantage in determining these standards by virtue of their specialized
knowledge of local conditions, but the federal government may also assert an interest by virtue
of its desire to reflect federal community standards in its welfare programs.
At bottom, considerations of equality and justice may point in various, even
contradictory, directions. But the absence of considerations of equality and justice in the
109
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devolution debate has resulted in a paucity of options for welfare federalism. (Re)introducing
these concepts into the debate will result in a wider, more diverse range of federalism options as
policymakers continue to consider devolution in welfare programs.
Conclusion
The two sides in the current welfare devolution debate seem to argue inexorably toward
two polar positions of complete federal control on the one side versus complete devolution on
the other. In support of these positions, the sides rely on a rhetoric that seems almost intuitively
narrow: the anti-devolutionists argue against devolution based on “race-to-the-bottom” and
“welfare magnet” predictions; the pro-devolutionists argue for devolution based on
“experimentation,” “responsiveness to local needs and desires,” and even “race-to-the-top”
theories. We may trace the intellectual roots of these arguments to a single assumption—the
mobility assumption—in Charles Tiebout’s famous 1956 article, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures and thus reveal the paucity of considerations or principles that feed the debate.
By expanding the debate beyond the sole principle of Tiebout’s mobility assumption, we
gain an appreciation for the rich possibilities in welfare federalism that are lost in the current
debate. By looking beyond mobility, we may discover additional principles that help sort out the
complex and appropriate roles for the federal and state governments in the design and
implementation of welfare programs.
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